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People’s perceptions of safety influence their risk taking. 
This phenomenon, studied under such rubrics as risk 
compensation (Adams & Hillman, 2001), risk homeosta-
sis (Wilde, 1998), and risk allostasis (Lewis-Evans & 
Rothengatter, 2009), is typified by people taking increased 
risks when using protective equipment (Adams, 1982) or 
at least reducing their risk taking when protective equip-
ment is absent (Fyhri & Phillips, 2013; Phillips, Fyhri, & 
Sagberg, 2011). Behavioral adaptation in response to 
safety equipment has been reported in studies examining 
drivers operating a vehicle with and without built-in 
safety devices (Sagberg, Fosser, & Sætermo, 1997), chil-
dren running obstacle courses with and without safety 
gear (Morrongiello, Walpole, & Lassenby, 2007), and 
bicyclists descending a steep hill with and without hel-
mets (Phillips et al., 2011). Work to date has been based 
on the assumption that people respond only to safety 
measures of which they are aware—an idea encapsulated 
in Hedlund’s first rule of risk compensation: “If I don’t 
know it’s there, I won’t compensate for a safety measure” 
(Hedlund, 2000, p. 87). Moreover, in research to date, the 
risk-taking behavior has been in the same domain as the 
safety measure (e.g., studies of seat-belt use in driving 
speed; Janssen, 1994).
Here, we changed both these approaches. First, we 
induced people to wear a helmet without their necessar-
ily being aware they were wearing safety equipment: 
Participants were (falsely) told they were taking part in 
an eye-tracking study so we could exploit the fact that 
the head-mounted eye-tracking device we employed 
comes with both a bicycle helmet and a baseball cap as 
its standard mounting solutions. At random, participants 
were assigned to wear one mount or the other and were 
simply told it was the anchor for the eye tracker. Second, 
we divorced risk-taking behavior from the safety device 
by using a computerized laboratory measure called the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), 
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in which the helmet could do nothing to change risk. We 
also measured sensation seeking and anxiety as possible 
explanatory variables for any effect.
Method
Participants
Eighty participants (15 male and 24 female in the helmet 
condition, 19 male and 22 female in the cap condition) 
between the ages of 17 and 56 years (M = 25.26, SD = 
6.59) took part in the study; no monetary reward was 
offered for participation. An a priori power analysis 
showed that 40 participants per condition should have 
80% power to detect an effect size (Cohen’s d) of 0.63. 
This was deemed sufficient, as we hoped to see relatively 
substantial effects of the helmet manipulation.
Materials
State anxiety was measured using the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) Form Y-1 (Spielberger, 1983). This form 
contains 40 questions, 20 that measure a person’s feelings 
of anxiety right at the moment of response and 20 that 
measure his or her chronic levels of anxiety. Participants 
here answered the former set. In the BART (Lejuez et al., 
2002), which we programmed in Real Studio (Xojo, 2011), 
participants pressed a button to inflate an animated bal-
loon on a computer screen. Each button press inflated 
the balloon more and increased the amount of fictional 
currency earned. If the balloon burst (which it would at 
a random point between 1 and 128 inflations), all 
earnings for that trial were lost. At any point, participants 
could choose to stop pumping and “bank” their accrued 
money. After the balloon burst, or after a decision to 
bank, the next trial began. Each participant completed 30 
trials, and his or her risk-taking score was the mean num-
ber of pumps made on trials on which the balloon did 
not burst. This score would be higher when participants 
risked losses by trying to maximize their score and lower 
when participants avoided risk and played more 
conservatively.
Sensation seeking was measured using the Sensation-
Seeking Scale Form V (Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 
1978). This scale measures four dimensions (10 self-
report items each) of sensation-seeking behavior: thrill 
and adventure seeking, disinhibition, experience seek-
ing, and boredom susceptibility. Bicycling frequency was 
measured using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6 
(five times a week or more). If a person selected anything 
other than “never” on this instrument, helmet-wearing 
frequency was measured using a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (never) to 6 (always).
Either an Abus (Phoenix, AZ) HS-10 S-Force peak 
bicycle helmet or a Beechfield (Bury, United Kingdom) 
B15 five-panel baseball cap was used to support the 
SensoMotoric (Teltow, Germany) head-mounted iView X 
HED-4.5 eye-tracking device (with its delicate 45° mirror 
removed; see Fig. 1). Participants responded to the scales 
using the Bristol Online Surveys Web site. All measures 
and the BART were completed on a 19-in. 4:3 LCD moni-
tor. The experimenter “operated” an Applied Science 
Laboratories (Bedford, MA) Eye-Trac 6 desk-mounted 
optics system with Eye-Trac PC. A fake nine-point 
Fig. 1. Photos showing how the eye tracker was mounted in each of the two conditions: to a baseball cap (left) and a bicycle helmet (right).
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eye-tracking calibration program was written in Real 
Studio to increase the verisimilitude of the eye-tracking 
procedure.
Procedure
This study was conducted in the University of Bath 
Department of Psychology’s eye-tracking laboratory. 
Participants were brought into the laboratory and told 
that they would complete a number of computer-based 
risk-taking measures while their point of gaze was mea-
sured using a head-mounted eye tracker. After reading 
information about the study on the computer screen and 
agreeing to participate, they entered their age and gender 
and completed the STAI Y-1. A screen then appeared say-
ing that the eye tracker would now be set up; the experi-
menter placed the cap- or helmet-mounted eye tracker 
on the participant’s head, making a show of carefully 
aligning everything as in a real eye-tracking procedure. 
The experimenter then moved to the eye-tracking com-
puter, where he or she ran the fake calibration software 
and conspicuously adjusted the eye-tracking controls to 
make it appear to participants that their eye movements 
were really being tracked. Participants then completed 
the Sensation-Seeking Scale, the BART, and the STAI Y-1 
again. Afterward, a screen appeared saying that the eye 
tracker was to be turned off, and the experimenter 
removed the apparatus from participants’ heads. 
Participants then completed the final STAI Y-1 before 
being debriefed, at which point they were informed of 
the deception and asked not to share details of the exper-
iment with anyone else. They then reported their bicy-
cling frequency and, if they did cycle, their helmet-wearing 
frequency.
Results
Wearing a helmet was associated with higher risk-taking 
scores (M = 40.40, SD = 18.18) than wearing a cap (M = 
31.06, SD = 13.29), t(78) = 2.63, p = .01, d = 0.59 (Fig. 2a). 
Similarly, participants who wore a helmet reported higher 
sensation-seeking scores (M = 23.23, SD = 7.00) than par-
ticipants who wore a cap (M = 18.78, SD = 5.09), Welch’s 
t(69.19) = 3.24, p = .002, d = 0.73 (Fig. 2b). These effects 
cannot be explained by the helmet affecting anxiety, as 
anxiety did not change significantly as a function of con-
dition, F(1, 78) = 0.19, p = .66, time of measurement, F(2, 
156) = 2.37, p = .10, or an interaction between the two, 
F(2, 156) = 1.18, p = .31 (Fig. 2c). Note that we used the 
square roots of the anxiety scores for analyses because of 
the skew seen in Figure 2c. There was no relationship 
between risk taking and gender, t(78) = 0.45, p = .66, bicy-
cling experience (ρ = .12, p = .27), and extent of helmet 
use when bicycling (ρ = .06, p = .60), nor, in regression 
modeling, interactions of any of these variables (e.g., the 
Condition × Bicycling Experience interaction was not sig-
nificant; t = 0.39, p = .70). Prior research has shown that 
helmets do not affect cognitive performance in demand-
ing laboratory tasks (Bogerd, Walker, Brühwiler, & Rossi, 
2014), which means the results cannot be attributed to 
this factor either.
Discussion
Laboratory measures showed greater risk taking and sen-
sation seeking when participants wore a helmet, rather 
than a baseball cap, during testing. These effects arose 
even though the helmet was introduced as a mount for 
an eye-tracking apparatus and not as safety equipment, 
and even though it could do nothing to alter participants’ 
level of risk on the experimental task. Notably, the effect 
was an immediate shift in both risk taking and sensation 
seeking. This finding contrasts with those of previous 
work on unconscious influence, such as experiments on 
the persuasive effects of head movements (Wells & Petty, 
1980) and environmental cues on consumer behavior 
(Berger & Fitzsimons, 2008), which looked instead at 
longer-term attitudinal changes from more overt signals.
Our findings are plausibly related to social priming, 
wherein social behaviors are cued by exposure to stereo-
types or concepts (Bargh, 2006). However, whereas social 
priming is generally understood in terms of behavior 
directed toward another person, the effects in this study 
were individual, focused on the risk-taking propensity of 
a person acting alone during exposure to a safety-related 
prime. Schröder and Thagard (2013) produced computa-
tional models of social priming in which primes activate 
shared cultural concepts in people’s minds, which in turn 
are associated with actions; through these links, the 
actions become available to the behavioral selection pro-
cess. Speculatively, if what we saw in this study were to 
be understood through such mechanisms, with the hel-
met invoking concepts of protection from risk and thereby 
subconsciously shaping behaviors, our findings might 
suggest that Schröder and Thagard’s social-priming frame-
work operates even when its interaction target compo-
nent (another person with whom to interact) is absent.
Our findings initially appear different from those of 
some other studies. Fyhri and Phillips (2013; Phillips 
et  al., 2011) found that risk taking in downhill bicy-
cling, measured through riding speed, did not simply 
increase when a helmet was worn; rather, the people 
who normally cycled with a helmet took fewer risks 
when riding without one. Why did the participants in 
Fyhri and Phillips’s study who were not habitual helmet 
users not react to wearing a helmet with increased risk 
taking, as our experiment might suggest they would? 
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Fig. 2. Distribution of scores for the helmet and cap conditions on (a) the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), (b) the 
Sensation-Seeking Scale, and (c) state anxiety, measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). For anxiety, scores 
are shown separately for time points before donning the eye tracker (Time 1), while wearing the eye tracker (Time 2), and 
after removing the eye tracker (Time 3). For each measure, the mean score across conditions is indicated by a vertical dotted 
line, and the mean score for each condition separately is indicated by a thick vertical line. Individual participants’ scores are 
shown as thin vertical lines (rug points; stacked when more than 1 participant obtained the same score). Overlaid on the 
rug-point plots are kernel-density curves (with arbitrary scaling) that illustrate the overall distribution of scores within each 
condition.
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all the mechanisms here, but for now, we speculate that 
the difference might be related to considerable varia-
tions between the two studies’ procedures. Fyhri and 
Phillips greatly emphasized the physicality of their task 
(“to increase the difference in measures between the 
helmet-on and -off conditions, all participants were 
instructed to cycle using one-hand in both conditions”; 
p. 60), which provides a direct link between the action 
(bicycling) and the condition (helmet wearing) that was 
absent in our study. Moreover, that study used a 
repeated measures design, in which participants were 
aware they were riding a bicycle both with and without 
a helmet. This could have meant that behavior changed 
through mechanisms different from those seen here, 
where participants took part only in one condition and 
were not aware of any manipulation, nor even that they 
were specifically wearing a safety device.
The practical implication of our findings, in which risk 
taking changed in a global way when the helmet was worn, 
might be to suggest more extreme unintended conse-
quences of safety equipment in hazardous situations than 
has previously been thought. The idea that people might 
take more risks when wearing safety equipment designed 
to protect against those risks has a considerable (Adams, 
1982, 1995; Adams & Hillman, 2001; Hedlund, 2000), 
although not uncontroversial (McKenna, 1988), history. If 
this laboratory demonstration of globally increased risk 
taking arising from localized protection were to be repli-
cated in real settings, this could suggest that people using 
protective equipment against specific hazards might also 
be unduly inclined to take risks that such protective equip-
ment cannot reasonably be expected to guard against. This 
is not to suggest that the safety equipment will necessarily 
have its specific utility nullified, but rather that there could 
be changes in behavior wider than previously envisaged.
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